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Abstract. We propose a new encryption primitive called Membership
Encryption. Let P(G) be a privacy-preserving token on a group at-
tribute/identity G, such that given P(G) it is hard to know the at-
tributes in G. In this membership encryption, if an encryption takes
as input an attribute A and the token P(G), the decryption requires
holding the membership A ∈ G, i.e., A belongs to this group attribute.
Membership encryption is applicable in constructing membership proof
A ∈ P(G) with privacy preserving on group attribute and the member-
ship. Membership encryption can be also utilized to construct an effi-
cient two-round K-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol. In this paper,
we construct a provably secure membership encryption where the group
token P(G) is constant-size with maximum number accountability on
attributes. Using our scheme, the proposed oblivious transfer protocol
exhibits the nice feature of O(1) communication cost for any K from re-
ceiver to sender, and O(N) communication cost from sender to receiver.
1 Introduction
Membership Proof. Proving that an attribute A belongs to a group attribute
G, denoted by group membership A ∈ G, is useful and non-trivial especially
when privacy protections are essential. Let P(O) denote privacy protection (e.g.
commitment) on the object O, such that given P(O) it is hard to know the object
O. The privacy-preserving membership proof falls into two different cases:
– P(A) ∈ G. The verifier knows the token P(A) and all attributes in G. The
prover wants to prove that the attribute in P(A) belongs to G without
leaking the real attribute A to the verifier. Assuming that each attribute is
an individual, this membership proof is towards privacy protection on the
involved individual. We found the technique called set membership proof
[11, 8, 6] is proposed for P(A) ∈ G.
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– A ∈ P(G). The verifier knows the attribute A and the token P(G). The
prover wants to prove that the group attribute in P(G) contains A with-
out leaking other attributes in G to the verifier. This membership proof is
aiming at protecting the privacy of non-involved individuals. We found the
technique called accumulator with witness [3, 2, 17, 14, 7, 1] can be seen as a
membership proof for A ∈ P(G).
Membership proof is useful in those privacy-preserving applications (see [11,
8, 6, 3, 2, 17, 14, 7, 1]), where P(O) instead of O is certified for privacy purpose,
and the prover wants to prove that the certified P(O) satisfies some membership.
Motivation. In this work, we extend the membership by proof to member-
ship by encryption. We are interested in exploring the notion of membership
encryption. Let G = {A1, A2, · · · , Ak} be a finite set of group attribute, and
P(G) denote the privacy-preserving group G. Following the membership proof
A ∈ P(G), the membership encryption A ∈ P(G) is defined as follows: when
the encryption takes as input A and P(G), the decryption requires holding the
membership A ∈ G.
We focus on the membership encryption A ∈ P(G) only as it can be naturally
transferred into the membership encryption P(A) ∈ G, when P(·) contains
only one attribute. For example, let G = {A1, A2}. To generate a membership
encryption P(A) ∈ {A1, A2}, we run membership encryption A1 ∈ P(A) and
A2 ∈ P(A) on the same message and R, where R = {r1, r2} and ri is the
randomness for Ai ∈ P(A) encryption. It is not hard to verify that this is
equivalent to the membership encryption P(A) ∈ G.
Encryption vs Proof. Membership encryption is more powerful compared
to membership proof in terms of three reasons. Firstly, a membership proof
A ∈ P(G) cannot be converted into a membership encryption, but a success-
ful decryption of membership encryption with A and P(G) as input naturally
implies the membership A ∈ P(G). Secondly, given a membership proof, the ver-
ifier might be able to compromise the privacy of P(G) to others by publishing
the membership proof A ∈ P(G). While the membership proof from member-
ship encryption is non-transferable. Finally, considering the scenario that Alice
would send a message to Bob if he can prove the membership A ∈ P(G). Us-
ing the membership proof, Bob needs to generate the proof first and then Alice
sends messages to Bob after checking the proof, which costs two separated steps.
Membership encryption combines the two steps into one, which improves the
communication efficiency.
Membership encryption is also useful in other applications. One of them is the
oblivious transfer protocol [19]. Suppose there are N messagesM1,M2, · · · ,MN ,
and a receiver wants to get part of them without leaking her/his choice to the
message owner (sender). Using the membership encryption, the receiver gen-
erates P(C) and sends it to sender, where C ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , N} is the receiver’s
choice. The sender then encrypts message Mi with the index i and P(C). If
i ∈ C, the receiver can decrypt the message Mi; otherwise i /∈ C, the receiver
will not be able to extract Mi. Suppose the number of choices is accountable
from P(C), we will obtain a two-round K-out-of-N protocol for any K from the
membership encryption A ∈ P(G).
Contributions. We propose a new encryption primitive called membership en-
cryption where the decryption satisfies the privacy-preserving group membership
A ∈ P(G). To be precise, in our membership encryption definition, P(G) is gen-
erated from the group attribute G and a secret token S. If the encryption takes
as input A and P(G), the decryption is successful if and only if the decryptor
knows (G,S) and A ∈ G is true.
We construct a provably secure membership encryption, which exhibits the
following nice features.
– The group token P(G) is constant-size and independent of the number of
attributes in G.
– The upper bound attribute number in P(G) is accountable.
– The ciphertext is constant-size and dependent on the length of security pa-
rameter only.
We show how to apply membership encryption in constructing a two-round
K-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocol OTKN for any 1 ≤ K ≤ N . Our protocol
satisfies the security model defined in [10]. In our protocol, messages from re-
ceiver to sender are the group token P(G) only and messages from sender to
receiver areN constant-size ciphertexts. Using our proposed scheme, the commu-
nication cost from receiver to sender is O(1) or constant-size, and communication
cost from sender to receiver is O(N) or linear in N . This is the first two-round
OTKN protocol with the least communication cost compared to existing two-round
oblivious transfer protocols [16, 18, 10, 9].
Roadmap. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We give the definition
and security models of membership encryption in Section 2. Our construction is
proposed in Section 3 with the security proof in Section 4. We show how to apply
membership encryption to the construction of two-round K-out-of-N oblivious
transfer protocols in Section 5. In the final section, we conclude this paper.
2 Membership Encryption
2.1 Description of Membership Encryption
A membership encryption A ∈ P(G) with maximum number accountability on
group attribute consists of the following five algorithms:
Setup: Taking as input a security parameter 1λ, an integer n and all attributes
{A1, A2, · · · , An}, the setup algorithm generates the system parameter SP .
Here, n denotes the upper bound attribute number of group tokens.
GroupGen: Taking as input the system parameter SP and a group attribute
G = {A1, · · · , Ak} (1 ≤ k ≤ n), the group token generation algorithm
returns the token P(G) and the secret key S.
Verify: Taking as input P(G) and an integer k, the verification algorithm re-
turns true if the attribute number in P(G) satisfying |P(G)| ≤ k; otherwise,
outputs false.
Encrypt: Taking as input the system parameter SP , an attribute A, a group
token P(G) and a messageM , the encryption algorithm returns a ciphertext
C of M . We define the ciphertext as C ← ME[A,P(G),M ].
Decrypt: Taking as input the attribute A, the group attribute G, the secret
key S and the ciphertext C, the decryption algorithm returns the message
M or ⊥. We define the decryption as {M,⊥} ← MD[C,G,S].
Correctness: The membership encryption must satisfy that for any system pa-
rameter SP , group token (P(G),G,S) and ciphertext ME[A,P(G),M ], if A ∈
G, we have MD[ME[A,P(G),M ],G,S] = M ; Otherwise, A /∈ G, we have
MD[ME[A,P(G),M ],G,S] =⊥ .
2.2 Security Models of Membership Encryption
Definition 1 (Message Security) A membership encryption captures the mes-
sage security if given a ciphertext generated with A and P(G), it is computa-
tionally hard to know the encrypted message when
– The decryptor does not have the secret key S of P(G), or
– The attribute A does not satisfy the membership, i.e., A /∈ G.
We define two games to capture message security. The first game is about
indistinguishability against secret key and says that if the corresponding secret
key S is unknown, it is indistinguishable to decide the message in a ciphertext for
the corresponding token P(G) and any attribute A. The second game is about
indistinguishability against membership and says that it is indistinguishable to
decide the message in a ciphertext for any attribute A and any group token
P(G) if A /∈ G holds.
Game 1: Indistinguishability against Secret Key.
– Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate the system
parameter SP , and sends it to the adversary.
– Phase 1: The adversary queries group tokens and decryption as follows.
• For a token query on group attribute Gi that is adaptively chosen by
the adversary, the challenger responds by generating (P(Gi),Si) and
sending P(Gi) to the adversary.
• For a decryption query on a ciphertext Ci for (A,P(Gi)) where P(Gi) is
generated by the challenger, if A /∈ G, the challenger returns ⊥ to the ad-
versary; otherwise, the challenger responds by decrypting the ciphertext
with Si, and sending the decryption result to the adversary.
– Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger one attribute A∗, one group
token P(G∗) and two messages M0,M1, where P(G∗) was generated in the
query phase. The challenger responds by randomly choosing a coin c ∈ {0, 1},
generating a ciphertext C∗ ← ME[A∗,P(G∗),Mc], and sending the challenge
ciphertext to the adversary.
– Phase 2: The adversary can continue the query the same as Phase 1 except
no decryption query on the challenge ciphertext C∗ for (A∗,P(G∗)).
– Win: The adversary outputs a guess c′ of c and wins the game if c′ = c.
We define the advantage of adversary as AdvI1 =
∣∣Pr[c′ = c]− 1/2∣∣.
Definition 2 A membership encryption generated with a security parameter 1λ
is (t, qk, qd, ε)-secure against secret key if for all t-polynomial time adversaries
who make qk token key queries at most and qd decryption queries at most, we
have ε = AdvI1 is a negligible function of λ.
Game 2: Indistinguishability against Membership.
– Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate the system
parameter SP , and sends it to the adversary.
– Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger one attribute A∗, P(G∗),G∗,
S and two messages M0,M1. The challenger first verifies that A /∈ P(G∗)
with G∗ and S. Then, the challenger responds by randomly choosing a coin
c ∈ {0, 1}, generating a ciphertext C∗ ← ME[A∗,P(G∗),Mc], and sending
the challenge ciphertext to the adversary.
– Win: The adversary outputs a guess c′ of c and wins the game if c′ = c.
We define the advantage of adversary as AdvI2 =
∣∣Pr[c′ = c]− 1/2∣∣.
Definition 3 A membership encryption generated with a security parameter 1λ
is (t, ε)-secure against membership if for all t-polynomial time adversaries, we
have ε = AdvI2 is a negligible function of λ. We call the membership encryption
selectively secure [4] against membership if the adversary must output A∗ and
G∗ before the setup of system parameters.
Definition 4 (Privacy) A membership encryption preserves the privacy of group
attributes if given a group token P(G) and two group attributes G0 = {A1, A2,
· · · , Ak1} and G1 = {A′1, A′2, · · · , A′k2}, it is computationally hard to decide
whether G = G0 or G = G1.
A secure membership encryption only guarantees the decryptor has the se-
cret key S and A belongs to G. To protect the privacy of group tokens, the
membership encryption must capture the privacy property defined above. The
game playing of privacy is defined as follows.
Game 3: Privacy.
– Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate the system
parameter SP , and sends it to the adversary.
– Challenge: The adversary gives the challenger two group attributes G0 =
{A1, A2, · · · , Ak1} and G1 = {A′1, A′2, · · · , A′k2}. The challenger responds by
randomly choosing a coin c ∈ {0, 1} and generating P(Gc) for Gc. Then,
the challenger sends P(Gc) to the adversary.
– Win: The adversary outputs a guess c′ of c and wins the game if c′ = c.
We define the advantage of adversary as AdvP =
∣∣Pr[c′ = c]− 1/2∣∣.
Definition 5 A membership encryption generated with a security parameter 1λ
preserves the privacy of group tokens with (t, ε) if for all t-polynomial time adver-
saries, we have ε = AdvP is a negligible function of λ. We say it unconditionally
preserves the privacy of group tokens if ε = 0 for any time t and SP is generated
by the adversary.
The properties of message security and privacy are sufficient for the defi-
nition of membership encryption. We define the additional maximum number
accountability so as to apply it to constructing a flexible (K,N)-oblivious trans-
fer protocol for any K ≤ N .
Definition 6 (Maximum Number Accountability) A membership encryp-
tion captures the property of maximum number accountability, if it is computa-
tionally hard to generate a group token pair (P(G),S) for G with k attributes,
but the verification shows that |P(G)| < k.
Game 4: Maximum Number Accountability.
– Challenge: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm to generate the system
parameter SP , and sends it to the adversary.
– Win: The adversary outputs (P(G∗),G∗,S) and wins the game if G∗ con-
tains k numbers of attributes but the verification on P(G∗) shows that it
contains less than k attributes.
We define the advantage of adversary as AdvA.
Definition 7 A membership encryption generated with a security parameter 1λ
is (t, ε)-secure with maximum number accountability if for all t-polynomial time
adversaries, we have ε = AdvA is a negligible function of λ.
3 Our Membership Encryption
3.1 Pairing Group
Our membership encryption can be built from any pairing group. Let GB be a
generator of pairing groups. Taking as input a security parameter 1λ, it outputs
a pairing group PG = (G, GT , e, p, g
′), where G,GT are two cyclic groups of
prime order p, g′ is a generator of G, and e : G × G → GT is the bilinear map.
The bilinear map e is a map with the following three properties:
– For all u, v ∈ G, a, b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
– e(g′, g′) is a generator of GT .
– It is efficient to compute the bilinear map e(u, v) for any u, v ∈ G.
3.2 The Scheme
Our group token generation is extended from the accumulator scheme in [17] with
two secret keys α and β. Let u ∈ G and u, uα, uα2 , · · · , uαn , uβα, uβα2 , · · · , uβαn
be the components of system parameter. The group token P(G) forG = {A1, A2,
· · · , Ak} ∈ Zp is defined as
P(G) = (w1, w2, w3) =
(
uτ
∏k
i=1(α+Ai), uτβ
∏k
i=1(α+Ai), uτβα
n−k ∏k
i=1(α+Ai)
)
where S = τ ∈ Zp is randomly chosen, and w3 is the element for attribute
number verification. Suppose u
1
(α+A)(β+A) is also in the system parameters and r
is a randomness from Zp. Our approach for membership is described as follows:
– If A ∈ G, we have w2wA1 contains (α+A)(β +A) such that
e
((
w2w
A
1
)r
, u
1
(α+A)(β+A)
)
= e(u, u)r
∏
Ai∈G/A(α+Ai)
is computable from ur and the system parameter.
– Otherwise, A /∈ G, we have w2wA1 = uτ(β+A)
∏k
i=1(α+Ai) such that
e
(
(w2w
A
1 )
r, u
1
(α+A)(β+A)
)
= e(u, u)r·
τ
∏
Ai∈G(α+Ai)
α+A
contains the inversion exponent 1α+A , which cannot be computed from u
r
and the system parameter.
We use the above two different results to encrypt messages so that the decryption
requires A ∈ G. The detailed construction modified from [15] with security
against chosen-plaintext attack (qd = 0 in Game 1) is described as follows.
Setup: Taking as input a security parameter 1λ, let n be the upper bound
attribute number in group token generation and let all attributes be A = {A1, A2,
· · · , An} ⊆ Zp, the setup algorithm works as follows:
– Choose a pairing group PG = (G, GT , e, p, g
′).
– Choose α, β, γ ∈ Zp and g, h ∈ G at random. Compute e(gγ , h) and gγα.
– Compute ui = h
γαi and vi = h
γβαi for all i = 0, 1, · · · , n.
– Randomly choose si from Zp and compute dAi for i = 1, 2, · · · , n as
dAi =
(
g
si
(α+Ai)(β+Ai) , h
si−1
α , hsi , hsiα, · · · , hsiαn−2).
The system parameter SP is defined as
SP =
(
PG, u0, u1, u2, · · · , un, v0, v1, v2, · · · , vn, e(gγ , h), gγα, dA1 , dA2 , · · · , dAn
)
.
GroupGen: Taking as input the group attribute G = {A1, A2, · · · , Ak} ∈ Zp
for any k ≤ n, let F (x) = ∏ki=1
(
x + Ai
)
and Fi be the coefficient of x
i, the
group token generation algorithm randomly chooses τ from Zp, sets S = τ and
computes P(G) as
P(G) = (w1, w2, w3) =
(
hτγF (α), hτγβF (α), hτγβα
n−kF (α)
)
=
( k∏
i=0
uFiτi ,
k∏
i=0
vFiτi ,
k∏
i=0
vFiτn−k+i
)
.
Verify: Taking as input P(G) and k, accept |P(G)| ≤ k if e(w2, un) = e(w3, uk).
Encrypt: Taking as input an attributeA ∈ A, a group token P(G) = (w1, w2, w3),
a message M ∈ GT and the system parameter, the encryption algorithm works
as follows:
– Verify that w2 = w
β
1 by checking e(w1, v1) = e(w2, v0).
– Randomly choose r from Zp. Compute the ciphertext on the message M as
C = (c1, c2, c3) =
((
w2w
A
1
)r
, (gγα)r, e(gγ , h)r ·M
)
.
Decrypt: Taking as input the ciphertext C, the secret key S, the attribute A,
the group attribute G and the system parameter, the decryption algorithm is
described as follows.
– Compute
c′1 = c
1
S
1 =
(
hrτγ(β+A)F (α)
) 1
τ
= hrγ(β+A)F (α).
– Compute the pairing
e1 = e
(
c′1, g
s
(α+A)(β+A)
)
= e(g, h)rsγ
F (α)
α+A .
– If A ∈ G, we have A is a root of F (x). Let F ′i be the coefficient of xi in F (x)x+A .
Compute the pairing
e2 = e
(
(h
s−1
α )F
′
0 ·
k−1∏
i=1
(hsα
i−1
)F
′
i , c2
)
= e(g, h)rsγ
F (α)
α+A−F ′0rγ .
– Compute M by
c3 ·
(
e2e
−1
1
) 1
F ′0 = e(gγ , h)rM · (e(g, h)−F ′0rγ
) 1
F ′0 =M.
3.3 Discussions
The above membership encryption is proposed for security against chosen-plaintext
attack (CPA), i.e., the adversary cannot make decryption queries. Let ME [M, r]
be our ciphertext on M encrypted with the randomness r. Using the Fujisaki-
Okamoto approach [13] in the random oracle model, we can easily extend it to
the security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). Let H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp and
H2 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}lm be cryptographic hash functions, where lm denotes the
length of messages. IfME [M, r] is secure against CPA, the following membership
encryption construction for (A,P(G)) is secure against CCA
ME[σ, H1(A,P(G), σ,M)
]
, H2(σ)⊕M.
It is not hard to prove CCA security under our security model definition in Game
1 with the proof in [13]. We omit it here.
Our membership encryption captures the following nice features.
– Constant-size P(G). Our group token P(G) consists of three group elements
only independent of the number of attributes in G.
– Maximum number accountability. According to our setting, we have
P(G) = (w1, w2, w3) = (w1, wβ1 , wβα
n−k
1 )
for k numbers of attributes. Through the verification, the verifier knows
that the exponent of w3 contains α
n−k. We have F (α) in w1 = hτγF (α) has
k degrees at most; otherwise, computing w3 needs h
γβ , hγβα
1
, · · · , hγβαn′ for
n′ > n and they are not given in the system parameter.
– Constant-size ciphertext. Our ciphertext is constant-size and is composed of
two group elements from G and one group element from GT . The length of
ciphertext depends on the length of security parameter only.
4 Proof of Security
In this section, we prove the security of our membership encryption. Before the
security analysis, we introduce three hard problems adopted in our reduction
proof.
4.1 Hard Problems
Our membership encryption uses a pairing group as an ingredient and its security
relies on the hardness of three problems that are slightly modified from the
GDDHE problem [12], the a-MSE-DDH problem [15] and the DHE problem [7].
The new hard problems are (f, n)-GDDHE problem that is adopted to prove
message security against secret key (Game 1), (f, g, n)-aMSE-DDHE problem
which is used to prove message security against membership (Game 2), and
(f, n)-DHE problem that is used to prove the property of maximum number
accountability (Game 4). We notice that the intractability of these three hard
problems can be analysed in the generic group model by following the proof
in [5, 12] for the original GDDHE problem. For completeness, we analyse these
problems based on the Theorem 2 in [12] in the full version of this paper.
Let g0, h0, w be random generators from G and a, γ be random integers from
Zp. The three hard problems are defined as follows.
(f, n)-GDDHE Problem:
Instance: Any (2n+ 1)-degree polynomial function f(x) ∈ Zp[x].
g0, g
a
0 , g
a2
0 , · · · , ga
2n
0 , g
af(a)
0 g
af(a)θ
0 .
h0, h
a
0 , h
a2
0 , · · · , ha
2n
0
w, wa, wa
2
, · · · , wa2n , wθ waθ
T ∈ GT , which is either at random or equal to e(g0, h0)f(a)θ
Target: Return b = 1 if T = e(g0, h0)
f(a)θ; otherwise, b = 0.
Definition 8 The (f, n)-GDDHE problem holds with (t, ε) if given an instance
generated from a security parameter 1λ and any (2n+1)-degree polynomial func-
tion f(x) ∈ Zp[x], the advantage of solving this problem in t polynomial time is
ε at most which is a negligible function of λ.
(f, g, n)-aMSE-DDH Problem:
Instance: Any (2n+ 1)-degree polynomial function f(x) ∈ Zp[x], and
any degree ≤ 2n polynomial function g(x) ∈ Zp[x], such that
gcd(f(x), g(x)) = 1 (or any nonzero number).
g0, g
a
0 , g
a2
0 , · · · , ga
2n
0 , g
θaf(a)
0
gγ0 , g
γa
0 , g
γa2
0 , · · · , gγa
2n+2
0
h0, h
a
0 , h
a2
0 , · · · , ha
2n
0 , h
θg(a)
0
hγ0 , h
γa
0 , h
γa2
0 , · · · , hγa
2n
0
T ∈ GT , which is either at random or equal to e(g0, h0)f(a)θ
Target: Return b = 1 if T = e(g0, h0)
f(a)θ; otherwise, b = 0.
Definition 9 The (f, g, n)-aMSE-DDH problem holds with (t, ε) if given an in-
stance generated from a security parameter 1λ and any two co-prime polynomial
functions f(x), g(x) in Zp[x] with (2n+1) degrees and ≤ 2n degrees respectively,
the advantage of solving this problem in t polynomial time is ε at most which is
a negligible function of λ.
(f, n)-DHE Problem:
Instance: g0, g
a
0 , g
a2
0 , · · · , ga
n
0 .
Output: Return (f(x), g
f(a)
0 ), where f(x) ∈ Zp[x] is an
n′-degree polynomial function n′ > n.
Definition 10 The (f, n)-DHE problem holds with (t, ε) if given an instance
generated from a security parameter 1λ, the advantage of solving this problem in
t polynomial time is ε at most which is a negligible function of λ.
4.2 Security Proof
Theorem 1 (Indistinguishability against Secret Key). Suppose the (f, n)-
GDDHE problem is (t, ε)-hard, we can construct (t′, qk, ε′)-secure membership
encryption against secret key. Here, t′ = t − O(qknte) and ε′ = εqk , where te
denotes the average time of an exponentiation in G.
The proof is given in the full version of this paper.
Theorem 2 (Indistinguishability against Membership). Suppose the (f, g, n)-
aMSE-DDH problem is (t, ε)-hard, we can construct (t′, qk, ε′) selectively secure
membership encryption against membership. Here, t′ = t − O(n2te) and ε′ = ε,
where te denotes the average time of an exponentiation in G.
We prove the security of membership in the selective security model in which
the adversary must output A∗ and G∗ before the setup of system parameter.
The security proof can be transformed into full security by correctly guessing
the challenge target, but it is only suitable for small n and G∗.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary who can break the membership en-
cryption against membership under selective security model. We construct an
algorithm B that solves the (f, g, n)-aMSE-DDH problem. B interacts with the
adversary as the follows.
Initialization. Let PG = (G, GT , e, p, g
′) be the pairing group and A =
{A1, A2, · · · , An} be all attributes. The adversary outputs (A∗,G∗) for chal-
lenge where A∗ /∈ G∗.
Setup. The algorithm B works as follows to simulate the system parameter.
– Let G∗ = {A∗1, A∗2, · · · , A∗k} be the attributes in G∗. Define the set G1 as
follows
G1 = {A1, A2, · · · , An}/{A∗1, A∗2, · · · , A∗k, A∗}.
– Randomly choose β0, β1 from Zp. Let f(x) be a (2n+ 1)-degree polynomial
function and g(x) be a (k + 1)-degree polynomial function defined as
(x+A∗)
∏
Ai∈G1
(x+Ai) ·
∏
Ai∈A
(β0x+ β1 +Ai)
∣∣∣f(x)
g(x) = (β0x+ β1 +A
∗)
∏
Ai∈G∗
(x+Ai),
such that gcd
(
f(x), g(x)
)
= 1 (or any nonzero number).
– Send f(x), g(x) to the (f, g, n)-aMSE-DDH problem generator. Let be chal-
lenge instance be
g0, g
a
0 , g
a2
0 , · · · , ga
2n
0 , g
θaf(a)
0
gγ0 , g
γa
0 , g
γa2
0 , · · · , gγa
2n+2
0
h0, h
a
0 , h
a2
0 , · · · , ha
2n
0 , h
θg(a)
0
hγ0 , h
γa
0 , h
γa2
0 , · · · , hγa
2n
0
T ∈ GT
– Set α, β, γ, g, h as
α = a, β = β0a+ β1, γ = γ, g = g
f(a)
0 , h = h0,
where a, γ are the randomness in the challenge instance.
– Compute e(gγ , h), gγα, ui, vi, as
e(gγ , h) = e(g0, h0)
γf(a), gγα = g
af(a)γ
0 , ui = h
γαi = hγa
i
0
vi = h
γβαi = hβ0γa
i+1+β1γa
i
0 .
– Compute dAi as follows.
• Randomly choose s′i from Zp and set
si = (s
′
iγa+ 1)fAi(a),
where fAi(x) is defined as follows
fAi(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1
β1+A∗
(β0x+ β1 +A
∗) if Ai = A∗,
1
Ai
(x+Ai) else if Ai ∈ G∗,
1 otherwise Ai ∈ G1.
We have
fAi(a)− 1
a
=
⎧⎨
⎩
β0
β1+A∗
if Ai = A
∗,
1
Ai
else if Ai ∈ G∗,
0 otherwise Ai ∈ G1.
such that
si − 1
α
=
(s′iγa+ 1)fAi(a)− 1
a
= f ′Ai(a)
= γs′ifAi(a) +
fAi(a)− 1
a
= a2γa+ a1γ + a0,
where a2, a1, a0 are coefficients. Let f
′′
Ai
(x) be defined as
f ′′Ai(x) =
f(x)fAi(x)
(x+Ai)(β0x+ β1 +Ai)
.
We have f ′′Ai(x) is a polynomial function with 2n degrees at most.
• Compute dAi as
(
g
s′iγaf
′′
Ai
(a)+f ′′Ai (a)
0 , h
f ′Ai (a)
0 , h
(s′iγa+1)fAi (a)
0 , · · · , h
(s′iγa+1)fAi (a)a
n−2
0
)
.
According to the setting of the randomness si = (s
′
iγa + 1)fAi(a), we
have
dAi =
(
g
s′iγaf
′′
Ai
(a)+f ′′Ai (a)
0 , h
f ′Ai (a)
0 , h
(s′iγa+1)fAi (a)
0 , · · · , h
(s′iγa+1)fAi (a)a
n−2
0
)
=
(
g
si
(α+Ai)(β+Ai) , h
si−1
α , hsi , · · · , hsiαn−2
)
.
All elements are computable from the challenge instance and setting. B gen-
erates the system parameter and sends it to the adversary.
Challenge. The adversary returns (A∗,P(G)∗,G∗,S∗,M0,M1) for challenge.
Let S = τ∗, P(G∗) = (w1, w2, w3) and G∗ = {A∗1, A∗2, · · · , A∗k}. The algorithm
B randomly chooses a coin c ∈ {0, 1}, and simulates the challenge ciphertext as
follows
C = (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3) =
((
h
θg(a)
0
)τ∗
, g
θaf(a)
0 , T ·Mc
)
.
Let r = θγ . If T = e(g0, h0)
θf(a), we have
(w2w
A∗
1 )
r = (hτ
∗γ
∏k
i=1(α+A
∗
i )(β+A
∗))r = (h
τ∗γg(a)
0 )
θ
γ =
(
h
θg(a)
0
)τ∗
(gγα)r = (g
γaf(a)
0 )
θ
γ = g
θaf(a)
0
e(gγ , h)r = e(g
γf(a)
0 , h0)
θ
γ = e(g0, h0)
θf(a) = T.
Therefore, C = (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3) is a valid ciphertext on Mc for (A
∗,P(G∗)). B sends
it to the adversary.
Win: The adversary outputs c′ ∈ {0, 1}, and the algorithm B outputs c′ as the
guess of T .
This completes the description of our simulation. If T = e(g0, h0)
θf(a), the
challenge ciphertext is valid and the adversary will output c′ = c with advantage
1/2 + ε; otherwise, T is universally random and the adversary’s advantage is
1/2. The simulation time is mainly dominated by the dA simulation, and each
dAi costs O(n) exponentiations. No abortion occurs during our simulation. We
therefore obtain the Theorem 2. 
Theorem 3 (Privacy). P(G) unconditionally preserves the privacy of all at-
tributes in G.
Proof. Let P(G) be a group token generated from G = {A1, A2, · · · , Ak1} and
S = τ . We have
P(G) = (w1, w2, w3) =
(
hτγ
∏k1
i=1(α+Ai), hτγβ
∏k1
i=1(α+Ai), hτβα
n−k1 ∏k1
i=1(α+Ai)
)
.
Since there exists G′ = {A′1, A′2, · · · , A′k2} and τ ′ ∈ Zp satisfying
τ
k1∏
i=1
(α+Ai) = τ
′
k2∏
i=1
(α+A′i),
we have P(G) can be also seen as a group token generated for G′ = {A′1, A′2, · · · ,
A′k2} and τ ′. Thus, the privacy of all attributes in P(G) is unconditionally
preserved. This completes the proof and we obtain the Theorem 3. 
Theorem 4 (Maximum Number Accountability). Suppose the (f, n)-DHE
problem is hard, the group token P(G) is secure with maximum number account-
ability.
The proof is given in the full version of this paper.
5 Oblivious Transfer from Membership Encryption
In this section, we show how to construct an efficient K-out-of-N oblivious trans-
fer protocol (OTKN) from membership encryption. Our OT
K
N protocol only requires
two rounds between receiver and sender. Using our construction, the OTKN proto-
col exhibits the nice property of constant communication cost, where the receiver
sends constant-size messages to the sender independent of K and N .
Suppose the sender has messages M1,M2,M3, · · · ,MN for any N ≤ n, and
the receiver wants to receive messagesMi1 ,Mi2 , · · · ,MiK for any {i1, i2, · · · , iK}
⊆ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Let SP be the system parameter of membership encryption,
where all attributes are the indices, i.e. A = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Our OT protocol from
membership encryption depicted in Fig. 1 is described as follows.
Receiver Sender
Choices: i1, i2, · · · , iK Messages: M1,M2, · · · ,MN
G = {i1, i2, · · · , iK}
S = τ
P(G) ← GroupGen[S,G, SP ]
P(G)−−−−−−−−−−−→
Verify that |P(G)| ≤ K
C1 = ME[1, P(G),M1]
C2 = ME[2, P(G),M2]
· · ·
CN = ME[N,P(G),MN ]
C = (C1, C2, · · · , CN ).
C←−−−−−−−−−−−
Mi1 = MD[Ci1 , G,S]
Mi2 = MD[Ci2 , G,S]
· · ·
MiK = MD[CiK ,G,S]
Fig. 1. K-Out-of-N Oblivious Transfer.
– The receiver runs the GroupGen algorithm to generate P(G) on G = {i1, i2,
· · · , iK}, and sends P(G) to the sender.
– Upon receiving P(G) from the receiver, the sender verifies that |P(G)| ≤
K. If it is false, reject. Otherwise, runs the encryption algorithm Ci =
ME[i,P(G),Mi] for all i = 1, 2, · · · , N and sends all ciphertexts C = (C1, C2
, · · · , CN ) to the receiver.
– Upon receiving all ciphertexts from the sender, the receiver runs the decryp-
tion algorithm MD[Ci,G,S] to get the message Mi for all i = i1, i2, · · · , iK .
Our OTKN scheme preserves receiver’s privacy and protects sender’s messages
against malicious receivers under the security model definition in [10]. According
to the Theorem 3, given P(G), the sender cannot distinguish P(G) which is
generated from either G = {i1, i2, · · · , iK} or G = {i′1, i′2, · · · , i′K}. According
to the Theorems 2 and 4, the receiver can only obtain chosen messages Mj for
all j ∈ {i1, i2, · · · , iK}.
The system parameter SP in our OT protocol can be generated by the sender
or the trust third party for the universal application. In our OTKN scheme, the
receiver sends the group token P(G) aggregated for all K choices and the sender
responds with N ciphertexts. The OTKN protocol is composed of two rounds
only. Using our membership encryption, our group token is constant-size and is
independent of the number of choice K, and our ciphertext is also constant-size
and is dependent on the security parameter only. In Table 1, we compare the
communication cost of all two-round K-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocols
in the literature. It shows that OTKN protocol from our membership encryption
requires the smallest communication cost.
Table 1. Communication cost of two-round K-out-of-N oblivious transfer.
[16] [18, 10, 9] Ours
Messages from Receiver to Sender O(N) O(K) O(1)
Messages from Sender to Receiver O(N) O(N) O(N)
6 Conclusion
Protecting membership privacy is essential in many applications. Existing solu-
tions were based on membership proof for P(A) ∈ G and A ∈ P(G). In this
work, we extended the membership proof to membership encryption. We in-
troduced the notion of membership encryption, where if the encryption takes
as input an attribute A and a privacy-preserving group token P(G), successful
decryption must satisfy A ∈ G. We constructed a provably secure membership
encryption where the group token P(G) is constant-size and the maximum at-
tribute number is accountable. The ciphertext is also constant and is dependent
on security parameter only. We showed how to apply our encryption scheme
to the construction of two-round K-out-of-N oblivious transfer protocols OTKN.
Using our membership encryption, the OTKN protocol only requires O(1) com-
munication cost from receiver to sender, against the other existing two-round
oblivious transfer protocols.
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Appendix A: Analysis of Hard Problems
Our intractability analysis is based on the proof given in [12] (Theorem 2). We
give the sketch here only, and refer readers to [12] for detailed proof by combining
the following analysis.
In the definition of (f, n)-DHE problem, no coefficients y0, y1, y2, · · · , yn′ exist
such that f(a) = y0 + y1a+ y2a
2 + · · ·+ yn′an′ is a polynomial function in Zp[a]
with n′ > n. The (f, n)-DHE problem therefore is hard in the generic group
model.
In the definition of (f, g, n)-aMSE-DDHE problem, let h0 = g
φ
0 , the polyno-
mial function f(a)θφ cannot be combined from
γ, γa, γa2, · · · , γa2n+2,
γφ, γaφ, γa2φ, · · · , γa2nφ
due to the unknown γ. The remained possible combination is from
a, a2, · · · , a2n, af(a)θ
φ, aφ, a2φ, · · · , a2nφ g(a)θφ
denoted by
f(a)θφ = A(a) · g(a)θφ+B(a)φ · af(a)θ,
where A(a), B(a) are any 2n-degree polynomial functions in Zp[a]. This case is
similar to the analysis in Theorem 2 [12], which shows that f(a)θφ is independent
of the given instance. Therefore, the (f, g, n)-aMSE-DDH problem is hard in the
generic group model.
In the definition of (f, n)-GDDHE problem, let h0 = g
φ
0 and w = g
ψ
0 , the poly-
nomial function f(a)θφ cannot be combined from ψ, ψa, ψa2, · · · , ψan, ψθ, ψaθ
due to the unknown ψ. The remained possible combination is the same as the
original GDDHE problem defined in [12], and the analysis shows that (f, n)-
GDDHE problem is hard.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary who can break the membership encryp-
tion against secret key by a chosen-plaintext attack. We construct an algorithm
B that solves the (f, n)-GDDHE problem. B interacts with the adversary as the
follows.
Setup. Let PG = (G,GT , e, p, g
′) be the pairing group and A = {A1, A2, · · · , An}
be all attributes. The algorithm B works as follows to simulate the system pa-
rameter.
– Pick random β0, β1, γ0 ∈ Zp and set α, β, γ, g, h as
α = a, β = β0a+ β1, γ = γ0, g = g
f(a)
0 , h = h0,
where B queries an instance of (f, n)-GDDHE problem satisfying
n∏
i=1
(x+Ai)(β0x+ β1 +Ai)
∣∣∣f(x).
– Compute e(gγ , h), gγα, ui, vi, as
e(gγ , h) = e(g0, h0)
γ0f(a), gγα = g
γ0af(a)
0 , ui = h
γαi = hγ0a
i
0
vi = h
γβαi = hγ0β0a
i+1+γ0β1a
i
0 .
– For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, randomly choose s′i ∈ Zp, and compute dAi as
dAi =
(
g
(s′ia+1)fAi (a)
0 , h
s′i
0 , h
(s′ia+1)a
0 , · · · , h(s
′
ia+1)a
n−2
0
)
.
Let si = s
′
ia+ 1 and fAi(x) be
fAi(x) =
f(x)
(x+Ai)(β0x+ β1 +Ai)
,
which is a (2n− 1)-degree polynomial function. We have
dAi =
(
g
(s′ia+1)fAi (a)
0 , h
s′i
0 , h
s′ia+1
0 , h
(s′ia+1)a
0 , · · · , h(s
′
ia+1)a
n−2
0
)
=
(
g
si
(α+Ai)(β+Ai) , h
si−1
α , hsi , · · · , hsiαn−2
)
.
All elements are computable from the challenge instance and setting. B generates
the system parameter and sends it to the adversary.
Phase 1. The algorithm B randomly chooses i∗ from [1, n] and simulate the
group token as follows:
– For a group token query on Gi, if i 	= i∗, run the GroupGen algorithm to
generate P(Gi).
– Otherwise i = i∗, let |Gi∗ | = k, compute P(Gi∗) as
P(G∗) = (w1, w2, w3) = (w, wβ , wβαn−k)
=
(
w, waβ0 · wβ1 , wβ0an−k+1 · wβ1an−k
)
,
which is computable from the challenge instance.
Challenge. The adversary returns (A∗,P(G∗),M0,M1) for challenge. If G∗ 	=
Gi∗ , abort; otherwise, P(G∗) = (w1, w2, w3) = (w,wβ , w3). The algorithm B
randomly chooses a coin c ∈ {0, 1}, and simulates the challenge ciphertext as
follows
C = (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3) =
(
(waθ)β0 · (wθ)β1+A∗ , (gaf(a)θ0 )γ0 , T γ0 ·Mc
)
.
Let r = θ, if T = e(g0, h0)
f(a)θ, we have
(w2w
A∗
1 )
r = (wβ0a+β1+A
∗
)θ = (waθ)β0 · (wθ)β1+A∗
(gαγ)r = (g
af(a)γ0
0 )
θ = (g
af(a)θ
0 )
γ0
e(gγ , h)r ·Mc = e(gγ0f(a)0 , h0)θ = T γ0 ·Mc.
Therefore, C = (c∗1, c
∗
2, c
∗
3) is a valid ciphertext on Mc for (A
∗,P(G∗)). B sends
it to the adversary.
Win: The adversary outputs c′ ∈ {0, 1}. Then, the algorithm B outputs c′ as
the guess of T .
This completes the description of our simulation. If T = e(g0, h0)
θf(a), the
challenge ciphertext is valid and the adversary will output c′ = c with advantage
1/2 + ε; otherwise, T is universally random and the adversary’s advantage is
1/2. The simulation time is mainly dominated by the token simulation, and
each token requires O(n) exponentiations. The simulation is successful when
G∗ = Gi∗ which holds with 1/qk probability. We therefore obtain the Theorem
1. 
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary who can break the membership encryp-
tion under maximum number accountability model. We construct an algorithm
B that solves the (f, n)-DHE problem. B interacts with the adversary as the
follows.
Challenge. Let PG = (G, GT , e, p, g
′) be the pairing group. The algorithm B
works as follows to simulate the system parameter.
– Randomly chooses β0, γ0 from Zp and sets
α = a, β = β0, γ = γ0
where a is the randomness in the challenge instance.
– B picks a random y ∈ Zp and sets
g = g0, h = g
y
0 .
We have
e(gγ , h) = e(g0, g0)
yγ0 , gαγ = gaγ00 , ui = h
γαi = (ga
i
0 )
yγ0 , vi = h
γβαi = (ga
i
0 )
yβ0 .
– For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, randomly choose s′i from Zp, and set
si =
(s′ia+ 1)(a+Ai)
Ai
.
We have
dAi =
(
g
si
(α+Ai)(β+Ai) , h
si−1
α , hsi , hsiα, · · · , hsiαn−2
)
=
(
g
sia+1
Ai(β0+Ai)
0 , g
y(
s′i
Ai
a+s′i+
1
Ai
)
0 , g
siy
0 , · · · , gsia
n−2y
0
)
.
All elements are computable from the challenge instance and setting. B gen-
erates the system parameter and sends it to the adversary.
Win: The adversary outputs (P(G),G,S), whereG = {A1, A2, · · · , Ak} but the
verification shows that |P(G)| < k. Let P(G) = (w1, w2, w3). If the verification
shows |P(G)| = k′ < k, we can write P(G) into
P(G) = (w1, w2, w3) =
(
w1, w
β
1 , w
βαn−k
′
1
)
.
Let S = τ , we have
w1 = h
τ
∏k
i=1(α+Ai) = g
yτ
∏k
i=1(a+Ai)
0 .
The algorithm B sets f(x) = yβτxn−k′ ∏ki=1(x+ Ai), which is an (n+ k − k′)-
degree polynomial function in Zp[x] and outputs (f(x), w3) as the solution to
the (f, n)-DHE problem.
This completes the description of our simulation and we obtain the Theorem
4. 
